Parapsychology and the Paranormal - Part I

Author: Sam Vaknin

Article:
I. Introduction

The words "supernatural", "paranormal", and "parapsychology" are
prime examples of oxymorons. Nature, by its extended definition,
is all-inclusive and all-pervasive. Nothing is outside its orbit
and everything that is logically and physically possible is
within its purview. If something exists and occurs then, ipso
facto, it is normal (or abnormal, but never para or "beyond" the
normal). Psychology is the science of human cognition, emotion,
and behavior. No human phenomenon evades its remit.

As if in belated recognition of this truism, PEAR (the Princeton
Engineering Anomalies Research laboratory), the ESP
(Extra-Sensory Perception) research outfit at Princeton
University, established in 1979, closed down in February 2007.

The arguments of the proponents of the esoteric "sciences",
Parapsychology included, boil down to these:

(1) That the human mind can alter the course of events and
affect objects (including other people's brains) voluntarily
(e.g., telekinesis or telepathy) or involuntarily (e.g.,
poltergeist);

(2) That current science is limited (for instance, by its
commitment to causation) and therefore is structurally unable to
discern, let alone explain, the existence of certain phenomena
(such as remote viewing or precognition). This implies that
everything has natural causes and that we are in a perpetual
state of receding ignorance, in the throes of an asymptotic
quest for the truth. Sooner or later, that which is now
perplexing, extraordinary, "miraculous", and unexplained
(protoscience) will be incorporated into science and be fully
accounted for;

(3) That science is dogmatically biased against and, therefore,
delinquent in its investigation of certain phenomena, objects,
and occurrences (such as Voodoo, magic, and UFOs - Unidentified
Flying Objects).

These claims of Parapsychology echo the schism that opened in
the monotheistic religions (and in early Buddhism) between the
profane and the sacred, the here and the beyond. Not
surprisingly, many of the first spiritualists were ministers and
other functionaries of Christian Churches.

Three historic developments contributed to the propagation and
popularity of psychical research:

(1) The introduction into Parapsychology of scientific methods
of observation, experimentation, and analysis (e.g., the use of
statistics and probability in the studies conducted at the
Parapsychology Laboratory of North Carolina's Duke University by
the American psychologist Joseph Banks Rhine and in the more
recent remote viewing ganzfeld sensory deprivation experiments);

(2) The emergence of counter-intuitive models of reality,
especially in physics, incorporating such concepts as nonlocal
action-at-a-distance (e.g., Bell's theorem), emergentism,
multiverses, hidden dimensions, observer effects ("mind over
matter"), and creation ex nihilo. These models are badly
understood by laymen and have led to the ostensible merger of
physics and metaphysics;

(3) The eventual acceptance by the scientific community and
incorporation into the mainstream of science of phenomena that
were once considered paranormal and then perinormal (e.g.,
hypnotism).

As many scholars noted, psi (psychic) and other anomalous
phenomena and related experiments can rarely be reproduced in
rigorous laboratory settings. Though at least 130 years old, the
field generated no theories replete with falsifiable
predictions. Additionally, the deviation of finite sets of data
(e.g., the number of cards correctly guessed by subjects) from
predictions yielded by the laws of probability - presented as
the field's trump card - is nothing out of the ordinary.
Furthermore, statistical significance and correlation should not
be misconstrued as proofs of cause and effect.

Consequently, there is no agreement as to what constitutes a psi
event.

Still, these are weak refutations. They apply with equal force
to the social "sciences" (e.g., to economics and psychology) and
even to more robust fields like biology or medicine. Yet no one
disputes the existence of economic behavior or the human psyche.

II. Scientific Theories

All theories - scientific or not - start with a problem. They
aim to solve it by proving that what appears to be "problematic"
is not. They re-state the conundrum, or introduce new data, new
variables, a new classification, or new organizing principles.
They incorporate the problem in a larger body of knowledge, or
in a conjecture ("solution"). They explain why we thought we had
an issue on our hands - and how it can be avoided, vitiated, or
resolved.

Scientific theories invite constant criticism and revision. They
yield new problems. They are proven erroneous and are replaced
by new models which offer better explanations and a more
profound sense of understanding - often by solving these new
problems. From time to time, the successor theories constitute a
break with everything known and done till then. These seismic
convulsions are known as "paradigm shifts".

Contrary to widespread opinion - even among scientists - science
is not only about "facts". It is not merely about quantifying,
measuring, describing, classifying, and organizing "things"
(entities). It is not even concerned with finding out the
"truth". Science is about providing us with concepts,
explanations, and predictions (collectively known as "theories")
and thus endowing us with a sense of understanding of our world.

Scientific theories are allegorical or metaphoric. They revolve
around symbols and theoretical constructs, concepts and
substantive assumptions, axioms and hypotheses - most of which
can never, even in principle, be computed, observed, quantified,
measured, or correlated with the world "out there". By appealing
to our imagination, scientific theories reveal what David
Deutsch calls "the fabric of reality".

Like any other system of knowledge, science has its fanatics,
heretics, and deviants.

Instrumentalists, for instance, insist that scientific theories
should be concerned exclusively with predicting the outcomes of
appropriately designed experiments. Their explanatory powers are
of no consequence. Positivists ascribe meaning only to
statements that deal with observables and observations.

Instrumentalists and positivists ignore the fact that
predictions are derived from models, narratives, and organizing
principles. In short: it is the theory's explanatory dimensions
that determine which experiments are relevant and which are not.
Forecasts - and experiments - that are not embedded in an
understanding of the world (in an explanation) do not constitute
science.

Granted, predictions and experiments are crucial to the growth
of scientific knowledge and the winnowing out of erroneous or
inadequate theories. But they are not the only mechanisms of
natural selection. There are other criteria that help us decide
whether to adopt and place confidence in a scientific theory or
not. Is the theory aesthetic (parsimonious), logical, does it
provide a reasonable explanation and, thus, does it further our
understanding of the world?

David Deutsch in "The Fabric of Reality" (p. 11):

"... (I)t is hard to give a precise definition of 'explanation'
or 'understanding'. Roughly speaking, they are about 'why'
rather than 'what'; about the inner workings of things; about
how things really are, not just how they appear to be; about
what must be so, rather than what merely happens to be so; about
laws of nature rather than rules of thumb. They are also about
coherence, elegance, and simplicity, as opposed to arbitrariness
and complexity ..."

Reductionists and emergentists ignore the existence of a
hierarchy of scientific theories and meta-languages. They
believe - and it is an article of faith, not of science - that
complex phenomena (such as the human mind) can be reduced to
simple ones (such as the physics and chemistry of the brain).
Furthermore, to them the act of reduction is, in itself, an
explanation and a form of pertinent understanding. Human
thought, fantasy, imagination, and emotions are nothing but
electric currents and spurts of chemicals in the brain, they say.

Holists, on the other hand, refuse to consider the possibility
that some higher-level phenomena can, indeed, be fully reduced
to base components and primitive interactions. They ignore the
fact that reductionism sometimes does provide explanations and
understanding. The properties of water, for instance, do spring
forth from its chemical and physical composition and from the
interactions between its constituent atoms and subatomic
particles.

Still, there is a general agreement that scientific theories
must be abstract (independent of specific time or place),
intersubjectively explicit (contain detailed descriptions of the
subject matter in unambiguous terms), logically rigorous (make
use of logical systems shared and accepted by the practitioners
in the field), empirically relevant (correspond to results of
empirical research), useful (in describing and/or explaining the
world), and provide typologies and predictions.

A scientific theory should resort to primitive (atomic)
terminology and all its complex (derived) terms and concepts
should be defined in these indivisible terms. It should offer a
map unequivocally and consistently connecting operational
definitions to theoretical concepts.

Operational definitions that connect to the same theoretical
concept should not contradict each other (be negatively
correlated). They should yield agreement on measurement
conducted independently by trained experimenters. But
investigation of the theory of its implication can proceed even
without quantification.

Theoretical concepts need not necessarily be measurable or
quantifiable or observable. But a scientific theory should
afford at least four levels of quantification of its operational
and theoretical definitions of concepts: nominal (labeling),
ordinal (ranking), interval and ratio.

(continued)

About the author:
Sam Vaknin ( http://samvak.tripod.com ) is the author of
Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited and After the Rain -
How the West Lost the East. He served as a columnist for Central
Europe Review, Global Politician, PopMatters, eBookWeb , and
Bellaonline, and as a United Press International (UPI) Senior
Business Correspondent. He was the editor of mental health and
Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory and
Suite101.